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ABSTRACT
This paper studies regimes of managed exchange rates for a small open
economy with an integrated capital market, ratíonal expectations in
finaTicial markets, sluggish nominal wages and prices, and supply shocks
that follow a Brownian motíon. Each regíme can be characterised by the
degree to which price shocks are accommodated and the width of the exchange
rate band. Special cases of monetary accommodation are a peg, a clean float
and a PPP exchange rate rule. Fírst, the optimal degree of monetary
accommodation of price shocks ís analysed when there is no exchange rate
band. Given that the welfare loss is a weighted sum of the asymptotic
variances of output and of consumer prices, monetary accommodation is
particularly strong when the authoritíes care relatively more about full
employment than price stability. More flexible labour markets induce right-
wing governments to move towards a cleaner float and left-wing governments
towards a PPP exchange rate rule. Second, the effects of exchange rate
bands and tt~e accompanying inframarginal interventions is examined when
allowance is made for intramarginal interventions as well. Such a set-up
can, in contrast to the píoneering Krugman model, explain the observed
hump-shaped unconditíonal density functions of EMS exchange rates.
Keywords: Optimal monetary accommodation, dirty floatíng, exchange rate
bands, PPP exchange rate rules, exchange rate peg, interest
rates, Brownian motion, price shocks, Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process, stochastic simulation.
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1 Introduction
The seminal paper of Krugman (1991) was the first to expiicitly
analyse the effects of exchange rate bands on exchange rate behaviour. When
fundamentals follow a Brownían motion with drift, the solutíon for the
exchange rate is a S-shaped functíon of fundamentals. Credible commítment
of the central bank to defend the exchange rate exerts a stabilísing
ínfluence on the exchange rete, even before intervention at the boundaries
of the band takes place. The reason ís that a weak currency goes with
expectatíons of future monetary contractiona in order to defend the band,
and thís strengthens the currency today.
Froot and Obstfeld (1991a) note that Krugman's model corresponds to a
stochastíc monetary model of a small open economy wíth perfectly flexible
nominal wages and príces, full employment, uncovered interest parity and
purchnsinK power parlty. Klein (1990) demonstrates that narrower bandwidths
ín a classical iaodel must lead to greater stabilísation of nomínal and real
exchange rates and of output. Svensson (1991a) shows that for narrow
exchange rate bands, the asymptotic unconditional variabílity of the
interest rate differential increases in the bandwidth, but for wide bands
it slowly decreases in the bandwidth. The instantaneous variability of the
interest rate differential monotonically decreases in the bandwidth. Note
that the instantaneous standard deviation of the interest rate differential
under a narrow band is high and increases when the band narrows, which
sharply contrasts with a regime of pegged exchange rate and a zero interest
rate differential. This observation may have some implications for the
transition from the EMS to the EMU. Svensson (1991a) also shows that the
asymptotíc unconditional density function of nominal exchange rates is U-
shaped, i. e. more mass is located towards the edges of the band than with
the uniform distribution.~
The applicability of the Krugman (1991) model is severely limíted due
to the assumptions of price flexibility and purchasing power parity. Miller
and Weller (1989, 1991) therefore extend the analysis to allow for sluggish
nominal wage dynamics, transitory unemployment and imperfect substitution
between home and foreign goods. Within this richer environment, one is able
to distinguish between real and nominal exchange rates. This seems an
essential extension, because it is difficult to make a welfare case for the
~ Svensson (1991b) derives properties of the term structure of
interest rates, which may be used to test the validity of the Krugman
(1991) target zone model of exchange rates.
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presence of exchange rate bands in a classícal model with full employment.
If wages and príces are perfectly flexible, one may as well have a peg or
one currency and reap all the benefíts of an optimum currency area.
Hovever, in the presence of nominal wage sluggishness and transitory
unemployment, one wonders whether the central bank has an interest in
monetary accommodation of wage and price shocks. Dornbusch (1982) and
Alogoskoufis (1991) examined the effects of monetary accommodation, and of
PPP exchange rate rules in particular2, on macroeconomíc stability in a
framevork of dírty floating. However, no work has been done on the effects
of monetary accommodation within nominal exchanga rate bands.3
The main objective of this paper is thus to relax the assumptions of
full employment and purchasing power parity prevalent in most of the
literature on exchange rate bands and consequently to analyse the effects
of monetary accommodation and of exchange rate bands on the exchange rate,
the interest rate, the consumption price index, unemployment and output. A
coefficíent of monetary accommodation equal to zero and to one correspond
to a clean float and a PPP exchange rate rule, respectively. One particular
value of the accommodation coeffícient corresponds to a peg. Given a
welfare loss functíon which is a weíghted sum of the asymptotic variances
of the consumption price index and output, the paper also analyses what the
optimal degree of monetary accommodatíon and bandwidth are. Typically, a
peg, a clean float or a PPP exchange rate rule are sub-optimal relative to
a more general dirty float. The imposítion of a band on the nominal
exchange zate corresponds to a nonlinear accommodation rule, because the
accommodation coefficient makes a discrete jump when prices (or the
exchange rate) move outside a band. Within the context of a línear model
2 Increased nominal exchange rate indexation ensures more stability in
the real exchange rate and the levels of demand and employment, but on the
other hand it amplifies the effects of wage disturbances on prices.
Alogoskoufis (1991) extends Dornbusch (1982) by highlighting the effects of
monetary accommodation and exchange rate accommodation on the forward-
looking behaviour of wage-setters and price-setters, and suggests that the
higher degree of persistence in inflation aríses from a higher degree of
accommodation in floating exchange rate regimes. For the model discussed in
this paper, the PPP exchange rate rule corresponds to 1008 monetary accom-
modatíon of price and wage shocks.
3 Lewis (1990) analyses a specifíc type of intramargínal interventions
(i.e. at each point of time there is a non-zero probabílity that the
Brownian motion of the fundamental is stopped) within the context of a
monetary model with full employment.
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and quadratic preferences, no welfare case can be made for such an exchange
rate band as long as íntramarginal accommodation is feasible.
Some other interesting results emerge from this analysis and provide
an answer to an important empirical puzzle for the EMS countríes. Figure 1
shows that the histograms approximating the unconditional density functions
of the guilder-Deutschemark and the franc-Deutschemark rate during the EMS
period are clearly hump-shaped, whereas Svensson (1991a) predicts on the
basis of the Krugman (1991) model that these density functions should be U-
shaped. For more recent years, the hump-shaped character of the histograma
of EMS exchange rates is even more pronounced. Theory predicts that most of
the probabilíty mass is located near the edges of the band, whereas EMS
data strongly indicate that the mass is concentrated near the middle of the
band. The extension of the Miller-Weller-Krugman model presented in this
paper offers an explanation of this empirical puzzle, that ís the hump-
shaped density function is a consequence of a relatively high degree of
mean reversion índuced by nominal wage sluggishness and monetary accommo-
dation. This explanation of hump-shaped density functions seems much more
satisfactory than one based on the antícipation of repeated realignments,
because realignments do not seem very likely for the EMS anymore.`
Section 2 studies regimes of pegged exchange rates and of dirty
floating for a small open economy with sluggish nomínal wages, transitory
unemployment, uncovered ínterest parity, imperfect substitution between
home and foreign goods, and rational expectations. For low degrees of
monetary accommodation, a permanent change in the money supply induces the
exchange rate to overshoot, whereas for high degrees of accommodation, the
exchange rate undershoots. The dividing line corresponds to that specífic
degree of accommodation which corresponds to pegged exchange and interest
rates.
Section 3 shows that, when shocks to the Phillips-curve follow a
Wiener process, the asymptotic variances of output and the real exchange
rate decline monotonically, whereas the asymptotic variances of production
and consumptíon prices increase mononotically with the degree of monetary
accownodatíon. The volatílity of the nominal exchange rate first declines
~ An alternative answer to the puzzle ís provided by Bertola and
Caballero (1992) and Bertola and Svensson (1991) who take account of the
anticipation of repeated realignments of the central parity. However, for
recenr. years this does not seem a very plausible answer as realignments
occur rarely nowadays.
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as accovvodation increases and completely disappears as one approaches a
peg, but then increases and approaches infínity as the money supply
approaches a PPP exchange rate rule. The asymptotic variance of the
interest rate declines and approaches zero as monetary accommodation
increases from zero to the value that ensures a peg. Subsequently, it first
risas and then falls to zero as the degree of accommodation approaches the
value corresponding to a PPP exchange rate rule. The optimal degree of
accommodation to price shocks is high when the suthoritíes care relatively
more about full employment than price stability. More flexible labour
markets induce right-wing governments to have a lower optimal accommodation
coefficient, i.e. move towards a cleaner float, and induce left-wing
governments to have a higher optimal accommodation coefficient, i.e. move
towards a PPP exchange rate zule.
Section 4 gives an explicit solution for the exchange rate when there
is intramarginal monetary accommodatíon wíthin an exchange rate band for
the special case that wages adjust instantaneously to clear the labour
market. Shocks to the full-employment level of output follow a Brownian
motion. The familiar S-shaped solutíon for the exchange rate as a function
of fundamentals emerges. When the accommodation coefficient approaches the
value corresponding to a peg, the S-shape becomes less pronounced and the
implícit band on prices becomes wider. The unconditional density function
for the exchange rate in this classícal model must be U-shaped.
To explain the hump-shaped density functions found for EMS exchange
rates, one must allow for a stronger form of inean reversion in the funda-
mentals. Section 5 shows that this can be achieved when one extends the
model to allow for nomínal wage sluggishness and transitory Keynesian
unemployment. It then follows that the solution for the exchange rate is an
inverted S-shaped function of the price level for low degrees of accommoda-
tion, and a regular S-shaped function for high degrees of accommodation.
Section 5 also discusses how the asymptotíc variances of prices, output,
the interest rate and the exchange rate depend on the degree of accommoda-
tion, and contrasts them with the values under a peg, a pure float and a
PPP exchange rate rule. This exercise suggests that the reason why some EMS
countries have a hump-shaped rather than a U-shaped unconditional density
functíon of the exchange rate is an accommo.`ation coefficient close to the
one corresponding to a peg. Hump-shaped density functions may thus 6e due
to EMS countries engaging ín intramarginal interventions (i.e. when the
S
exchange rate is inside its band) as well as inframarginal interventions
(when the exchange rate is on one of [he boundaries of its band) to
stabílise the exchange rate.
It is difficult to make a welfare case for exchange rate bands on
stabilisation grounds alone. Section 6 therefore briefly discusses the
welfare loss from having exchange rate bands within the context of a linear
model and quadratic preferences, that is the welfare loss from having a
nonlinear rather than a linear accommodation rule. It also discusses some
second-best issues, such as what is the optimal bandwidth for a gíven
degree of monetary accommodation and how does the optimal degree of
accommoda[ion change when the bandwidth narrows. Sectíon 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Unemployment and ezpectations in a small open economy
2.1 The model
Most of the existing models of exchange rate bands are based on the
classic work of Krugman (1991), and adopt the assumptions of flexible wages
and prices, full employment and purchasing power parity. However, for
policy purposes it is essential to allow for sticky nominal wages and
transitory unemployment. Otherwise, it is very difficult to make a case for
monetary accommodation or to provide a rationale for exchange rate bands.
It is also important to allow for imperfect substitution between home and
foreígn goods, so that one can allow for the effects of the real exchange
rate on aggregate demand. Niller and Weller (1989, 1991) therefore extend
the analysís of Krugman (1991) to the familiar exchange rate overshooting
model of Dornbusch (1976). Here a stochastic version of such a model of a
small open economy is extended to allow for regimes of managed exchange
rates and for monetary accommodation of price shocks. The resulting model
may be summarised by the following equations:
y- - q(i - x) t á (e t P - P). 0~0, O~d~l
m- p- y - a i, a10
dp -~(y - yF) dt t x dt t odz, dz - IN(O,dt), ~~0





q-(1-a) P t o(p t e), OtaSk (2.5)
m-PtB (P - 1~) - (1-B) Yt~P. ~Q (2.6)
where m, y, yF, p, p, q, e and z denote logarithms of the nominal money
supply, the level of aggregate demand, the full-employment level of output,
the home príce level, the foreign price level, the consumer price index
(CPI), the nominal exchange rate (price of one unit of foreign currency ín
terms of domestic currency units) and a supply shock, respectively, i and
í~ denote the home and foreign nomínal interest rate, respectívely, and x
denotes the rate of core inflation. All variables are expressed as deviati-
ons from original steady-state values. The foreígn varíables are non-
stochastic and can be normalised to zero.
Equation (2.1) is the IS-curve and shows that aggregate demand
increases when the real interest rate declines or the real exchange rate
depreciates. The real interest rate is simply the nominal interest rate
minus the core inflation rate. Equation (2.2) ís the Il7-curve and says that
the velocity of circulation increases with the nominal interest rate.
Equation (2.3) is the Phillips-curve which shows that ínflation in wages
and producer prices occurs when there is a shortage of labour, and that
deflation occurs when there ís unemployment. The speed at which the labour
market clears, i.e the degree of labour market flexibility, is determined
by the parameter m. The full-employment level of output can be normalísed
to zero (yF-0). Supply shocks (z) follow a Brownian motion and correspond
to positive shocks to nominal wages; z follows an independent Wiener
process vith zero mean and instantaneous variance equal to o. Producer
prices are a constant mark-up on unit labour costs, so that supply shocks
may be interpreted as negative shocks to labour productivity. The money
supply is stable in the steady state, so core inflation (x) being the
expected steady-state rate of inflation is assumed to be zero.s
5 The advan[age of this simple specification is that one can unambigi-
ously determine that the system is saddlepath stable. For example, if
aggregate demand depends on the zeal consumption interest rate, i.e. the
nomínal ínterest rate minus the rationally expected change in the CPI,
there is a possibility of an unstable spiral. In other words, higher
ínflation depresses the real interest rate, boosts aggregate demand and
thus induces even higher inflation. The use of core inflation ín the
definition of the real interest rate avoids these indeterminacies and
símplifies the algebra.
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Equation (2.4) is the uncovered interest parity condition. Risk-
neutral arbitrage ensures that an interest differential in favour of the
domestic country can only be sustaíned if the currency is expected to
deprecíate in the future, i.e. if the currency is currently over-valued.
Equation (2.5) shows the CPI as a weíghted average of domestic prices and
foreign prices (expressed in home currency units). The share of imports in
total expenditures corresponds to a. Fínally, equation (2.6) is the
feedback rule for the monetary authorities where p is the exogeneous or
long-run component of the nominal money supply and ~ is the accommodation
coefficient. The rextion rule says that, when príces exceed their long-run
value (í.e. the exogeneous component of the money supply), the monetary
authorities accommodate and raise the money supply. If ~ is close to unity,
the central bank accommodates almost all excessive demands for hígher wages
and prices, whilst if ~ is close to zero, the central bank does not give in
to such demands.
2.2 Pegged exchange rates
Under a regime of pegged exchange rates, say a peg, the monetary
authorities use unsterilísed interventions in the foreign exchange market
to stabilise and fix the nominal exchange rate. For example, when [he
foreign interest rate exceeds the domestic interest rate, there is an
incipient capital outflow and pressure for the currency to depreciate. The
central bank defends the exchange rate by selling foreign reserves and
buying its own currency, and as a result the money supply falls until the
domestic interest rate is pushed up to the level of the foreign interest
rate. Similarly, when home prices increase or foreign prices decrease,
there is pressure on the currency to depreciate and the central bank
defends the exchange rate by selling foreign reserves and contracting the
money supply.
A peg corresponding to e-ep implies that the domestíc ínterest rate
is anchored to the foreign interest rate, i-i~, and that an independent
domestic monetary policy is infeasible:
m-(1-á) P t ó(P t ep) -( nta) í~ g( ~) (P - F~) t p. (2.7)
Hence, a regíme of pegged exchange rates corresponds to a very speeific
form of monetary accommodation, namely ~-1-b and P-ptep-(~ta)í~~ë. Upon
0
substitution of these results into equations ( 2.1) and (2.3), one finds
that prices follow an Orstein-Uhlenbeck process (Karlin and Taylor, 1981,
p. 172):
dP--~ IO i~yó íP -P - ep)] dttodz. (2.8)
The asymptotic distribution of this process has:
mean(P)-P`tep-(q~6)í~-p and var(P)-o2~(2~ó).
One can show that mean(y)-0, mean(q)-pteP-(1-a)(q~ó)i~, var(y)-oZ6~(2~) and
var(q)-(1-a~)zoZ~(2~ó). An increase in labour market flexibility (~) reduces
both the varíance of príces and the variance of output. In a classical
model wíth full employment the varíance of prices and output tend to zero.
An increase in the sensitivity of aggregate demand to relatíve prices (é)
reduces the varíance of prices, but íncreases the variance of output. As
far as forecasting is concerned, one has:
E(p(tts) ~ p(t)-x] - mean(p) [1-exp(-~ós)] t x exp(-mós), s~0
var[p(tts) ~ p(t)-x] -(1 - exp(-2~ós)] var(p), s70.
Clearly, prices and the other variables follow mean-reverting processes.
With the aid of Bergstrom (1984, pp. 1154-1155), one can solve for the
inflation rate over, say, a unit time interval:
var(C,p) - var[p(t)-p(t-1)] - 2[1 - exp(-~ó)] var(p)
and símilarly for var(Oq). Note that when [he labour market is completely
inflexible, the variance of the price level is infinite whilst the variance
of the rate of inflation equals (the product of) the instantaneous variance
of supply shocks (and the time interval). When the labour market is
perfectly flexible, the variance of both the price level and the rate of
inflation are zero.
2.3 Honetary accommodatíon under a dirty float
In general, the monetary authorities follow a linear feedback rule
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such as ( 2.6). An advantage of such a simple rule is that í t is easily
understood by the market. A regime of floating exchange rates with a rule
for monetary accommodation such as (2.6) will be referred to as a dirty
float. The reduced form equations of the model under a dirty float are:
dP - m(9ta)-tl-[datq(1-~)] P t áa (etp ) t p(1-~) ít) dt t odz (2.9)
Ede - I(qta)-t[(1-~-b) p t 6(etp )- (1-~) Lt] - i'I dt. (2.10)
The price level is a predetermined, backward-looking variable, whílst tha
exchange rate ís a non-predetermined, forward-looking variable which jumps
if private agents suddenly anticipate a change in future policy. The
rational expectations equilibrium must therefore be a stable saddlepath
solution. This requires one eigenvalue wíth a negative real part and one
eigenvalue with a posltíve real part, whích is ensured as long as ~Q
holds. To find the unique, non-explosíve ratíonal expectations solution
under an unrestricted dirty float, one postulates a linear saddlepath:
e - mean(e) - ~ [p - mean(p)] (2.11)
where mean(p)-ítta(1-~)-íl' and mean(e)-mean(p)-p'tqó-ti'. Upon substitution
of (2.11) ínto (2.9) and (2.10) and equating coefficients, one finds:
~ -l~n(1-~)fó(ltl~)- [~n(1-R)tó(lt~~)]zt4.l~ó(1-~-6) I.
l 2 ~ó J
In fact, there are two solutions for w. However, the other solution can be
ruled out because i t does not satisfy the requirement that the adjustment
of prices along [he saddlepath must be a stable process. Stabilíty requires
that, i f ~G1-à and thus ~KO, wGl-(1-~)ó-~ and, if ~~1-D and [hus
rv~0, rv~l-(1-~)b-~. Clearly, the above solution for w is stable.
For low degrees of monetary accommodation, i. e. ~G1-b, there is a
negative correlation between nominal exchange rates and prices, wGO, and
for high degrees of monetary accommodation, ~1-ó, there i s a positive
correlation between nominal exchange rates and prices along the ssddlepath,
w~0. The turning point is the degree of monetary accommodation that corres-
ponds to a peg, ~-1-b. The saddlepath solutíons foz these two cases of low
and high degrees of monetary accommodatíon are presented in Fígure 2. Given
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that ó ?~S, ít can be shown that the smallest value of w exceeds -1.
The steady state corresponds to the mean of the asymptotic distríbu-
tions, i. e. omitting the effects of i one has mean(p) - mean(etp )- y.
In the long run relative purchasing power parity holds and money ís
neutral. The effect of a 18 increase in the exogeneous (or long-run)
component of the money supply, {t, raises prices and exchange rates by
exactly 18, independent of the degree of monetary accommodation in the
short run.
The full-employment locus requires, in the absence of shocks, stable
prices ( dp-0) and is steeper than 45~, because i ts slope (ltq(1-~)(ab)-~) is
greater than unity. A 18 íncrease in the price level reduces aggregate
demand through an appreciation of the real exchange rate and through a
contraction of real money balances, hence to ensure full employment the
exchange rate must depreciate by more [han 18. The effect on real money
balances is less when the accommodation coefficient i s high, so that as ~
íncreases the full-employment locus becomes flatter and tilts towards the
45~ line.
The ínteres[-parity locus requires that the market expects a stable
exchange rate ( Ede-U). An increase in [he price level induces on the one
hand a monetary contraction and an increase i n the interest rate, less so
if there i s a high degree of monetary accommodation, and on the other hand
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, a fall in aggrega[e demand and a
fall in the ínterest rate. The latter ( former) effect i s more líkely to
dominate when ~ ís high ( low), in which case a depreciation (appreciation)
of the exchange rate is required to push up (depress) the interest rate
back to the foreign rate. More precisely, the slope of the interest-parity
locus (-(1-~-á)~6) i s negative for low degrees of monetary accommodation
(~1~1-b), whilst i t is positive and less than unity for high degrees of
monetary accommodation (~1-d).
The qualitative properties of the rational expecta[ions equilibrium
solution are very much dependent on the degree of monetary accommodation.
For example, Figure 2 shows that an increase ín the exogeneous or long-run
component of the money supply induces overshooting of the exchange rate
(cf., Dornbusch, 1976) for low degrees of accommodation. The market expects
an interest rate differential in favour of abroad and thus over time a
gradually appreciatíng exchange rate, so that the exchange rate must on
impact over-react. However, for high degrees of accommodation, the exchange
11
rate undershoots on impact. A gradual íncrease in prices is accompanied by
a gradual expansion of the money supply, so that the anticipated gradual
rise in interest rates i s less pronounced. Consequently, the exchange rate
depreciates less and the interest rate falls less on impact thus leading to
undershooting rather than overshooting of the exchange rate. Also, the
steady-state value of the exchange rate increases by more when there is
more accommodation, thus making undershooting more likely.
The special case of a peg corresponds to ~-1-6 (see section 2.2),
whích implíes w-0. A peg ensures stable exchange and interest rates, hence
the interest-paríty Locus and the saddlepath ( SS) are horizontal and
coincide. In general, the saddlepath i s for ~~1-á downward-slopíng and
becomes flatter as the accommodation coefficient i s increased.
The special case of a regime of unrestricted floating exchange rates
corresponds to an exogeneous supply of money and no accommodation (~-0).
This will be referred to as a clean float. Thís case always leads to
overshooting of the exchange rate after a monetary expansion (vx0). In
general, one has a dírty float which ensures that the exchange rate adjusts
instantaneously to ensure equilibrium on the balance of payments.
Figure 3 summarises the dependence of the slope of the saddlepath, w,
on the accommodation coefficient. Basically, w ís an íncreasing function of
~, and i s negative for low and positive for high values of ~. Figure 3
also shows the dependence of the slope of the saddlepath on the degree of
Labour market flexibílity, m . As m increases, the relationship between ~
and ~ pivots around the peg (~-1-D) towards the horizontal axis. In the
extreme case of a classícal model with full employment, ~-~oo, one has a
horizontal saddlepath, w-0, and no transitional dynamics.
2.4 PPP exchange rate rule
The special case of full accommodatíon of price shocks (~-1) means
that the full-employment, the interest-parity locus and the saddlepath
coincide with Che 45~ line (w-1). l~hen ~-1, one has m-p and the expected
change in the real exchange rate is from (2.9)-(2.10) given by:
E d(pte-p) -(1-ma)ó(qta)-~ (p'te-p) dt - i' dt. (2.12)
6 In fact, this is the case if á?0.5, ~p51 and a~51.
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If the inequalíty ~atl is satlsfied, the rational expectations equilibrium
solution for the real exchange rate is that it must jump to:
p t e- P-(~ta)b-t(1-ma)-t i~ (2.12')
Full accommodation of price shocks thus eliminates under rational expecta-
tíons all transitional dynamics. It í s thus clear that 1008 accommodation
of price and wage shocks corresponds to a rule which ensures that the
domestic ínterest rate i s pegged to the foreign interest rate, that the
real exchange rate i s fixed, and thus that employment and output are at
their natural rates. This special case corresponds to a PPP e:change rate
rule of the type discussed by Dornbusch (1982) and Alogoskoufís (1991), and
induces non-stationary nominal prices and exchange rates (var(p)-var(e)~oo).
3 Optimal monetary accommodation under a dirty float
This paper assesses the case for managed exchange rates. In order to
do this, assume that the monetary suthoritíes minímíse the followíng
welfare loss function:
W- var(y) t ry var(q), ry~0 (3.1)
where W denotes the welfare loss. Hore conservative and more independent
central bankers are likely to care more about CPI stability rather than
full employment and thus have a higher value of ry. Of course, the optimal
outcomes for ~ are unaffected when the authoríties minimise expected
squared deviations from some desired value.~
Since there are no bands on exchange rates, the underlying model is
linear and the expected values of the variables cozrespond exactly to the
solution of the determinístic model obtained by setting a-0. Hence, the
optimal value of ~ in the policy rule (2.6) is independent of the value of
o. This property is what is referred to as ceztainty equivalence and no
longer holds once there are bands on exchange rates (see sections 4, 5 and
6).
Along the saddlepath solution, prices follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
~ The authorities could have mínímised a discounted integral. of
squared deviations, but here an asymptotic welfare loss criterion is used
in order not to get detracted by initial-value problems.
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process:




var(e) - wz var(p),
var(etp'-p) - ( 1-w)2 var(p),
cov(e,p) - w var(p),
var(y) - [1-o(1-w)]2 var(p),
var(Y) - I[óa(1-w)i-v(1-~))~(7ta))Z var(P)
and
(3.2)
var(i) - I[1-~-d(1-w)J~(~ta)Iz var(p).
The dependence of these asymptotic variances under a dírty float on ~ are
sketched i n Figures 4-9.
Since w increases in ~, ít i s clear that var(p) increases in ~. In
fact, with full accommodation of price shocks (~-1), i.e. a PPP exchange
rate rule, var(p) tends to infinity. When labour markets are more flexible
(m higher) príce volatility i s less. The variance of nomínal exchange rates
first decreases with the accommodation coefficíent, but once a peg has been
reached increases with the accommodation coefficient. In fact, var(e) tends
to infinity when all price shocks are fully accommodated and a PPP exchange
rate rule ís in place. Obviously, var(e)-0 for a peg (~-1-b). However, the
variance of real exchange rates typically declínes with the accommodation
coefficient and is only zero when there i s full accommodation of price
shocks and a PPP exchange rate rule (~-1). For low degrees of monetary
accommodation, there i s a negative correlation between nominal exchange
rates and producer prices whilst for high degrees of mone.tary accommodation
there i s a positive correlation. It is also straíghtforward to establish
that the variance of the CPI increases with the degree of accommodation.
Furthermore, the variance of the CPI is always less than the varíance of
the producer price because w~l.
The variance of output i s zero when there i s full accommodation of
price shocks, i.e. a PPP exchange rate rule. Typically, the variance of
output declines with the degree of monetary accommodation. The variance of
nominal interest rates i s zero both when there is a peg and when there is
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full accommodation of príce shocks and a PPP exchange rate rule in place.
For other degrees of accommodation, var(i) i s positive.
The asymptotic variance of CPI inflation over a unít time ínterval
can be written as:
var(~9) - 2 var(q) (l - expl-~I6a(1-~)t7(1-6)1~(9}~))) (3.3)
Clearly, when labour markets clear instantaneously, var(Gq)-2var(q). In
general, it can be shown that var(~q) is an increasing function of the
accommodation coefficient (~). Typícally, the variance of inflation is less
than the variance of the príce level, especially for high degrees of
accommodation.
From the point of víew of optimal polícy formulation, it is useful to
have Figure 10 which shows a convex policy frontier characterísing the
trade-off between the variance of employment and the variance of the CPI (a
second-order asymptotíc Phillips-curve). Obviously, the optimal accommoda-
tion coefficient decreases when the weight gíven to CPI stability rather
than full employment ( ry) increases. Very right-wing governments who attach
an extremely high value to CPI stability find a clean float (~-0) optimal.
In general, ít is optimal to have a dirty float.ó
As the degree of labour market flexíbílity (~) increases, both the
varíance of output and of the CPI diminísh and thus the policy frontier
moves towards the origín. For low degrees of accommodation (QG1-b), the
optímal accommodation coefficient decreases, and for high degrees of
accommodatíon (~~1-ó), the optimal degree of accommodation increases.9 The
former case suggests that right-wing governments view a more flexible
labour market as a reason for a cleaner float, whereas the latter case
suggests that left-wíng governments view this as a reason for a PPP
exchange rate rule. Clearly, when wages and prices immedíately adjust to
ensure full employment (~oo) var(y), var(p) and var(q) tend to zero so that
the degree of monetary accommodation (as long as i t is not complete, i.e.
~G1) is irrelevant and the specífíc nature of the nominal exchange rate
regime does not matter.
e The welfare loss under a peg ís independent of a and n, since u.ider
a peg var(y) - b2var(p) - bo2~(2~).
9 The reason is that as ~ increases, the ratio var(q)~var(y) íncreases
when ~G1-b and decreases when ~1-b.
15
An íncrease in the share of fozeign goods in the consumption basket
(o) decreases CPI variability ( given that var(e)GVar(p) must hold when ~G1
and oG~s) , but does not affect output varíability. It is therefore clear
that the optimal accommodation coefficient (~) increases in the degree of
exposure to interna[ional trade (a~).
4 Exchange rate bands, monetary accommodation and full employment
To facilítate a comparison with the results of Krugman (1991),
Svensson (1991a) and Klein (1990), the model ís first solved under the
assumption that wages adjust instantaneously to clear the labour market
(~-.oo). Suppose that supply shocks affect the full-employment level of
ou[put rather than prices and that they have an instantaneous varíance
equal [o o', that is the full-employment level of output consists of a
deterministic component (yF) and a stochastíc component (c) which follows a
Brownian motlon wlthout drlft:
y- yF t c, dc - o' dz, dz - IN(0, dt). (2.3')
This classical specífication of the labour markett~ replaces the Keynesian
specificatíon (2.3). The complete model includes (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4)-
(2.6). The reduced form of this classical model is:
E de - q't [ó ( etp-p) - (yFte)] dt - i~ dt
3 [7(I-~)tóa]-t [ó(1-~) (etP -V) - ( 1-á-ó) (YFtc)] dt - í~ dt
-[(e - f)~a'j dt or e dt - f dt t a' E de (4.1)
and
P-[óa (P t e) t n(1-á) l~ - (nta) (YF t e)1~[0(1-~)tóa]
where
a' - In(1-R)tóa]I[ó(1-6)1 ~ o
and
(4.2)
to This specification of permanent shocks to the full-employment level
of output corresponds closely to the format of Krugman (1991). One could
alternatívely maintain (2.3), but assume that o-o'~ and let both o and ~
tend to infiníty keeping o' constant. This alternative specification
ímplies transitory shocks to the full-employment level of output.
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f v p- P t a'i~ t[á(1-á)1-~ (1-~-á) (YF t c) - f' t c'.
The fundamental ( f) consists of two components. The first component (f') ís
a constant whích increases i n the long-run component of the money supply
and the foreign interest rate, and decreases in the foreign price level.
The second componenC (c'á(1-~-á)E~[á(1-~)]) i s due to Brownian motion in
the supply of goods and has an instantaneous standard deviation given by
o" -(1-Q-á)o'~[b(1-~)]. When bubbles are excluded, it follows that the
rational expectations solution of (4.1) is gíven by
e(t) - EL [~ exp(-(s-t)~a') f(s) ds]~a'. (4.3)
s -t
Hence, the exchange rate is an average of present values of expected future
fundamentals with (l~a') being the rate of discount. Under a dírty float
wíthout exchange rate bands, one has
e(t) - f(t) z f'(t) t f'(t) (4.4)
as EL[f(s)J-f(t), s~t.
So far, the analysis has allowed for a linear rule for monetary
accommodation. In practice, monetary authorities often restrict themselves
to target zones for nominal exchange rates. For example, the EMS countries
have committed themselves to keep exchange rates within a}2.258 band
around a central rate, except for the United Kingdom which has a t68 band.
Here allowance is made on the one hand for infinitesimal intervention at
the upper boundary, e~, and lower boundary of the band, e~, to prevent the
exchange rate going out of the band, and on the other hand for monetary
accommodation according to the rule (2.6) within the band.
If one postulates a nonlinear solution of the form e-fl(f) and
applies Ito's Lemma (e.g. Harrison, 19B5), one obtains:
e- fl(f) - f t~S a"2 a' (!" (f) - f t K~ exp(w~f) t KZ exp(wZf) (4.4' )
where the roots w~ and wZ follow from the characteristic equatíon
y~ (~.a„ 2) w2 t (~,f.) w- 1- U
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and the constants K~ and KZ follow from the smooth-pasting conditions
(1'(ft)-fl'(tU)-0 where e~~l(fU) and e~~l(ft). When the constant component
of the fundamental ís zero (f'-0) and the band is symmetric ( e~--et), one
obtains the symmetric solution~~
e- n(f) - f- ]w cosh(w t~]-1 sinh(~ f), ~:(2~a,)K~Q,,. (4.5)
Clearly, the solutíon e-fl(f) has the S-shape familiar from the model of
Krugman (1991). As the accommodation coefficíent (~) approaches the value
corresponding to a peg (1-ó), W increases and the S-shape becomes less
pronounced in the sense that the implicit band on prices becomes wider.
This classical model ímplies a U-shaped unconditional densíty function of
the exchange rate (cf., Svensson, 1991a). To account for the hump-shaped
unconditional density functions exhíbited by EMS exchange rates, one has to
allow for a stronger form of inean reversion.t2 This is what Sectíon S sets
out to do.
Krugman (1991) assumes purchasing power parity and thus a constant
real exchange rate. Here the real exchange rate is stochastic,
Pte-P-IO(1-á)}óa]-~n(1-~)Ia'í~tK~exp(w~f)tK2exP(wzf)]tó-~(YF~). (4.6)
even when there is no band on the nominal exchange rate (Ki-K20).
5 Exchange rate bands, monetary accommodation and unemployment
5.1 Analysís
To allow for a stronger form of inean reversion in the fundamental,
labour market inflexibility is introduced. It is thus necessary to solve
the system (2.9)-(2.10) with the nonlínear interventíon policy arísing from
exchange rate bands and íntramarginal monetary accommodatíon. To do this,
one pos[ulates ínstead of the linear saddlepath solutíon (2.11) a twíce
differentiahle functíon for the solution:
~~ Clearly, when there is a laxer monetary policy at home than abroad,
the constant component of the fundamental is positive (f'10), the currency
has a tendency to be weak, and thus more of the probability mass is
concentrated near the upper part of the band.
~Z Froot and Obstfeld (1991b) díscuss the effects of an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process for the fundamental in the Krugman (1991) model.
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e t p' - l~ - n ~P - P) . (2.11')
Use of Ito's Lemma, dit - fl' dp t k o2 n" dt, yields a second-order
nonlinear differential equation (cf., Míller and Weller, 1989, 1991):
~S oz n "(P) t~(vta)-~ (-Ibatn(1-~)1 P t 6a (1(P)) n'(P) -
(~ta)-t [(1-b-9) P } b fl(P)1 - 0.
This equation yields a time-ínvariant relation between exchange rates and
prices. Note that there are exactly two linear solutions which correspond
exacr.ly to the stable and the unstable arm of the saddlepath solution of
the dirty float model discussed in sections 2 and 3. These linear solutions
are, of course, nol compatible wíth the presence of finitely wide exchange
rate bands.
Corresponding to the exchange rate bands, one can use the solution to
(5.1) to define bands on producer prices ("fundamentals"), namely p~~(1'~(e~)
and pt-f2-i(et). For low degrees of monetary accommodatíon, ~G1-b, (1'GO and
thus p~Gpt. For high degrees of monetary accommodation, ~1-b, fl'~0 and
thus p~pt. The solution for these two cases yields an inverted S-shape
and a normal S-shape, respectívely, and are both presented in Figure 11.
The slopes of the nonlinear saddlepath at the origín are exactly the same
as the slope of the linear saddlepath under a dirty float (see Section 3).
To pin down a unique solution, one needs to impose the smooth-pastíng
conditions (cf., Dixit, 1989; Krugman, 1991; Miller and Weller, 1989, 1991)
in order to avoíd one-way bets by market participants. If these conditions
do not hold at pt and p~, the expected change ín the exchange rate would
díscretely jump at these boundaries whích is incompatible with the absence
of unexploited arbitrage opportunities. Clearly, the nonlinear saddlepath
has maximum absolute value of slope at the orígin and zero slope at the
boundaries.
Because the market anticipates a regime swítch at the boundaries of
the band, the solution bends and becomes horizontal as the economy approa-
ches the boundaríes. This is what is known as the 'honeymoon effect' and
becomes stronger as the band on exchange rates narrows. Clearly, a higher
varíance oz leads to a stronger honeymoon effect as a higher coefficient of
!1"(p) in (5.1) introduces more nonlinearity. A higher value of a adds to
the forward-looking character of the solution and, typically, the exchange
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rate solution bends more towards the central parity, i.e. there is a
stronger lioneymoon effect.
Figure 12 shows how the wídth of the band on the price level depends
on the accommodation coefficient. For low degrees of accommodation, the
upper bound e~ translates into a lower bound on the price level, p~~0,
which increases towards infinity as the accommodation coefficient approa-
ches the value corresponding to a peg. The poínt is that very low prices
induce an expansion of the real money supply and thus a depreciation of the
currency, possíbly forcíng it beyond the upper bound. For high degrees of
accommodation, the upper bound e~ translates into an upper bound on the
price level, p~0, which decreases from infinity as the accommodation
coefficient approaches uníty. The inward shift ín the I24-curve arising from
high prices Ls now attenuated by accommodation, but the IS-curve shifts
back a lot. The result ís an incipient interest rate dífferential in favour
of the foreígn country and pressure on the currency to depreciate on
impact, possibly forcing it outside the band. An íncrease in a increases
the band on prices. An increase in m increases (decreases) the band on
prices when ~ is less than (exceeds) 1-á. An increase ín o2 leads for a
given exchange rate band to a wider band on prices.
The accommodatíon coefficient of the monetary authoríties only
changes at the boundaries of the exchange rate band. In other words, the
monetary authoríties employ a nonlínear accommodation rule:
m-~ p, i f et~e~ee ( i.e. pe~ptpt for pGl-b, pt~ptp~ for ~1-ó),
m-(1-ó) p t b et, i f e~ei (i. e. pipt for ~~1-6, p5pt for ~1-á),
m-(1-6) p t 6 e~, i f eie~ (i. e. p~po for Q~1-á, p?pe for ~1-ó).
Fígure 13 sketches the money supply rule, both for high and low degrees of
monetary accommodation. At the upper (lower) bound for the exchange rate,
there ís a danger that the currency deprecíates (appreciates) outside the
band. The monetary authorities thus implement a discrete contraction
(expansion) of the money supply which raises (depresses) the interest rate
and prevents the exchange rate from moving outside the band.
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5.2 Simulated unconditional varíances
To compare the asymptotic uncondítional variances of the model under
a nonlínear intervention rule with those discussed in section 3, it is
necessary to resort to numerical Honte Carlo simulatíons (see Appendix).
The reason is that one cannot obtain an analytical closed-form solutíon for
the exchange rate when it is inside the band, and ít is diffícult to find
expressions for the time spent at either the upper or the lower boundary of
the band. The parameter values that have been used in all the simulations
are q-á-~-a-k and a symmetric band of 2.258. Note that the existence of the
distributíon functions requires, as shocks are normally distributed, that
the process for the exchange rate ís stationary and ergodic.
Figures 14 and 15 portray the simulated distributions of the nominal
exchange rate and interest rate differential under various, degrees of
accommodation. When the degree of accommodation is not very strong or close
to the PPP rule, the simulated density functions of the exchange rate are
II-shaped and the exchange rate spends a relatively large proportion of the
time near the boundaries of the band. However, when the accommodatíon
coefficient approaches the value correspondíng to a peg, these density
functions are hump-shaped and the exchange rate spends a relatively large
proportion of the time near the central parity.13 The latter case clearly
resembles the one found for EMS exchange rates (see Figure 1). Thís
strongly suggests that countries such as France and the Netherlands
stabilise theír exchange rate through intramarginal as well as inframargi-
nal interventions.~~ As far as the interest rate is concerned, most of the
probability mass ís concentrated around the foreign interest rate. Further-
more, Figure 7 shows that the variance diminishes as the accommodation
coefficient approaches the value corresponding to a peg. Note that, as one
approaches the PPP rule, the variance of the in[erest rate approaches zero
under an unrestricted float but approaches a positive value under a band.
In fact, the variance of the interest rate'under a PPP rule first increases
and then decreases as the bandwidth, and finally ís zero for an infinite
~~ The reason is the combined effect of inean reversion arising from
the Phillips curve, the band on príces gettíng wider and consequently the
relative amount of time spent between the margins getting larger as ~
approaches 1-b
14 This explanation offers an alternative to the one based on repeated
realignments offered by Bertola and Caballero (1990).
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bandwidth.
Nussa (1986) noticed that for many countríes the volatility of real
exchange rates declines as the volatility of nominal exchange rates
declines. Obviously, this phenomenon can only be explaíned within the
context of a Keynesían model with nomínal wage sluggishness. Figures 8 and
9 illustrate that this stylised fact can be explained when ~G1-ë, i.e. for
low accommodation coefficients a reduction in the bandwidth is accompanied
by a reduction in the variance of the real as well as of the nominal
exchange rate. However, for hígh accommodation coefficíents a reduction in
the bandwidth raises the variance of the real exchange rate,
6 Welfare losses arising from a nominal eachange rate band
Within the class of linear dynamic models and quadratic preferences,
it is never optimal to have a nonlinear policy rule (e.g. Davis, 1977,
Chapter 5). Since the imposition of a exchange rate band corresponds to a
nonlinear accommodation rule (see Figure 13), it is clear that exchange
rate bands induce welfare losses.~s A key question is how much worse one
ís off with a band on the nominal exchange rate ínstead of an unrestricted
dirty float. Fígure 10 confirms that the policy frontier corresponding to
an unrestricted dirty float lies entírely below the ones corresponding to
an exchange rate band and gives an idea of these losses. As the bandwidth
approaches infini[y, the policy frontier approaches the one corresponding
to an unrestricted dirty float. If the bandwidth goes to zero, the policy
frontier reduces to a point, i.e. the point corresponding to the peg. In
fact, all the policy frontiers go through [his same point irrespective of
the bandwídth.
Clearly, the model of sections 2 and 3 is a special case of the model
of section S, namely the case where the exchange rate band ís infinitely
wide. In general, the monetary authorities can choose two instruments, i.e.
the accommodation coefficient (~) and the bandwidth (ee --ei). Given the
availabilíty of the first instrument, it is never optimal to use [he
second. To put it differently, the optimal bandwidth from a stabilisation
point of view is infínite. However, one can phrase a second-best questíon:
15 Of course, it may be possible to make a welfare case for exchange
rate bands on credibility rather than on stabilisation grounds but that is
beyond the scope of the present paper. Here it is assumed that the monetary
authorities commit themselves to a simple accommodation rule, which can
readily be understood by private agents.
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What are the reductions in welfare losses one can achieve with having a
finíte exchange rate band given that one has a given degree of monetary
accommodation of the form (2.6) within band? Figures 4, 6 and 10 provide an
answer.
Fígure 4 plots the variance of output against the accommodation
coefficient for various bandwidths. When the accommodation coefficient
corresponds to the value of a peg, the bandwidth ís irrelevant. In fact,
the varíous plots pivot around ~-1-b. When one decreases the width of the
band from infínity (an unrestricted dirty float) to zero (a peg), the plot
of var(y) bends and becomes more and more horizontal. For low levels of
accoounodation, var(y) under a band is less than that under an unrestricted
dírty float. For high levels of accommodation, var(y) under a band is
greater than that under a dírty float. The intuition of the shape of these
plots is that, for a given ~, the varíance under a band ís roughly a
weíghted average of the variance under an unrestricted dírty float and
under a peg.
Figure 6 plots var(q) versus ~ for various bandwidths. Again, the
plots pivot around Q-1-b. When the bandwidth becomes smaller, var(q)
increases for low and decreases for high levels of accommodatíon. The plots
for var(p) are given in Figure 5. They are qualitatively the same, except
that var(p)~var(q) for all values of Q.
If the authoritíes can only use a líttle accommodatíon ín between the
bands, one expects that the higher the weight the authoritíes attach to CPI
rather than output stabilíty (ry), the lower the chance that the authorities
wish to impose a narrow exchange rate band. Figures 4, 6 and 10 confirm
this, because under an unrestricted dirty float or a wíde band the variance
of output ís hígher and the variance of the CPI is lower than under a
narrow band.
These figures also show that, with high degrees of accommodation, an
urirestricted dirty float or a wide band leads to less volatility of output
and more volatility of the CPI. In that case, right-wing authorities are
more likely to impose a narrow exchange rate band.
Figure 10 shows the policy frontier under a}2.258 and a t68 band. In
a sense, increasíng accommodation when ~G1-b is like reducing bandwidth,
and when ~1-6 it is like increasing bandwidth. In partícular, for a given
value of ~ below (above) 1-d, a reduction in bandwidth depresses (raises)
var(y) and raises (depresses) var(q).
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Perhaps, a more in[eresting second-best questíon is how the optimal
degree of accommodation changes as the band narrows. For low degrees of
accommodation (~~1-6), the variance of the CPI rises and that of output
falls as the band narrows. IC may then be optímal to reduce the degree of
intramarginal accommodatíon, because this reduces the variance of the CPI
and increases that of output. For high degrees of accommodation, the
variance of the CPI falls and that of output risea as the band narrows so
that if the authorities compensate they choose [o have a higher degree of
íntramarginal accommodation.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper studied a small open economy under a dirty float. It
analysed the optimal degree of monetary accommodation and showed that this
increases when the relative weight on employment rather than on CPI
stability increases. More flexible labour markets induce right-wing
governments to move towards a cleaner float and lef[-wing governments
towards a PPP exchange rate rule. A clean float, a peg or a PPP exchange
rate rule are seldom optimal. Thís paper also extended the Miller-Weller-
Krugman model to allow for monetary accommodation of price shocks within
the band. An interestíng feature is tha[ when the accommoda[ion coefficíent
approaches the value corresponding to a peg, the unconditional density
function of the exchange rate is hump-shaped rather than U-shaped, This
finding explains a s[ylised fact of EMS exchange rates which cannot be
explained with the classical Krugman (1991) model or the more Keynesian
Miller-Weller (1991) model, because these studies do not allow for intra-
marginal interventions. For low values of the accommodation coefficient,
the model can also explain a stylised fact commented on by Mussa (1986),
that is as the exchange rate band narrows the varíance of both the real and
the nominal exchange rate diminish.
It is hard to make a case for exchange rate bands, since the welfare
loss can more effectively be reduced by means of a linear accommodation
rule without bands. This suggests that the welfare case for exchange rate
bands cannot be made on stabilísation grounds alone. Future research may
therefore be directed at investigating whether a welfare case for exchange
rate bands can be made on credibility rather than on s[abilisation grounds.
Such an analysis may trade off the benefits of a simple fixed rule in terms
of enhanced credibility against the costs ín terms of reduced scope for
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stabilisation (cf., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988).
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Appendiz: Monte Carlo simulations
The simulation techqique ís based on Duffie and Singleton (1988).
Prior to simulation, the second-order ordinary differential equation (5.1)
is solved numerically for the function (1(p). Given roughly 200 points of
this function between the boundaries of the band, intermediate points were
found using linear interpolatíon of the two nearest points. Third-order
polynomial interpolation (Davís and Rabinowitz, 1975) yields results that
are hardly different. To simulate the structural continuous-time model, it
must be discretised. The parameter values that have been chosen correspond
to a unit time interval. First, given p~, et and a draw from the normal
distributíon for the additive shock, pt,~ can be calculated as a linear
combination of these three variables. Second, one can calculate e~,~-fi(pt,~)
from the numerical solution (1(p). It is straightfozward to calculate the
simulated values of other endogeneous variables as well.
Clearly, this discretisation is much too coarse and estima[es of
asymptotic variances based on this discretisation are inconsistent. Better
approximations are obtained if the model is simulated at a higher frequency
and a finer grid is used. Hence, in practice each unit of time is divided
into n parts and n in-between simulations are performed over each of the T
unit time intervals. Obvíously, the parameter values are adjusted to allow
for the higher sampling frequency. Similarly, the variance is adjusted to
allow for the higher frequency, i.e. o~n replaces o. Although more sophis-
ticated schemes are available, a simple first-order Euler scheme has been
used in the simulatíons presented in this paper. Duffie and Singleton
(1986) show that consistent estimation of the variances of the variables
26
requíres a minimal ratio n~T, at which both n and T should go to infinity.
In fact, for the special processes consídered here, the second-order
Milshtein scheme reduces to the Euler scheme.
The set-up of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure is as follows.
From a long time series, N series of T observations are drawn, making sure
to throw away a number of observations between subsequent sequences of T
observations. A grid of n is used for the in-between simulations. In
practice, typical values were n-25, N-10 and T-1000.
If n tends to infinity, the discrete approximation to the continuous-
time distribution becomes exact. Because all variables are defíned to have
an asymptotic mean equal to zero and n is chosen to be relatively large,
[he test statistic
sx,iz a (xtiz t x2i2 t... t xTiz)~T. i-1,2,...,N
is approximately an unbiased estímator of the unconditional variance of the
varíable x. Clearly,
-zz ( 2 z . 2)Isn sx t t sX z t. sn M N
ís also an estimator óf the unconditional variance of x. The statistic
f(Sx t2-snz)2 t .. . t(s, Nz-sxZ)Z]IIN(N-1) ]
is approximately an unbiased~ estimator of the variance of sxZ, given that
the number of observations thrown away between subsequent sequences of T
observations is large enough to rule out serial correlatíon between the
sx iz.
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Figure 2: A permanent increase in the money supply under a dirty float
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Figure 4: Variance of output under various bandwidths
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Figure 6: Yariance of the CPI under various bandwidths
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Figure 10: Optimal sonetary accommodation under a dirty float
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Figure 12: Price bands and exchange rate bands
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Fi9ure 13: Nonlinear ieoney supply rules
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Figure 14: Simulated distribution of the exchange rate under a










(b) Almost a peg (8-0.46)
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Fiyure 15: Si~ulated distribution of the interest rate diffe-
rential under a band and varying degrees of accon~-
modation
(a) A clean float (6-0)









(b) Almost a peg (8-0.46)
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